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Reviews of American Sämoa, Niue,
Tokelau, Tonga, and Tuvalu are not
included in this issue.
Cook Islands
This was a year of birthdays in the
Cook Islands. The nation’s first polit-
ical party, the Cook Islands Party
(cip), celebrated its fortieth birthday
in March 2004. By October, the Girl
Guides, the oldest uniformed women’s
organization, commemorated seventy-
five years of activity since its arrival in
the country. And the Baha’i faith, the
earliest non-Christian denomination
to come into the Cook Islands, cele-
brated its fiftieth birthday. Also in
October, the Child Welfare Associa-
tion commemorated seventy years of
service. The year also saw the contin-
uation of a worrying population
decline, unpopular political party
switches by members of Parliament,
cabinet reshuffles, land controversies,
immigration concerns, and apprehen-
sion about economic development.
High-profile personalities dominated
the media, influencing election prepa-
rations, government actions, and poli-
cies. The dramas included convicted
New Zealand business tycoon Mark
Lyon; Ministry of Marine Resources
Secretary Navy Epati; and Eddie
Drollett, former chief of staff of the
prime minister’s department.
Efforts by Mark Lyon to seek
sanctuary in Rarotonga attracted
much attention, generating demands
from the newly formed Concerned
Citizens Group for an investigation,
as well as expressions of unease from
the two major political parties and
trenchant media queries about the
circumstances surrounding his resi-
dency. In an effort to win public sym-
pathy, Lyon issued an open letter to
the people of Rarotonga, declaring, 
“I came here for the first time in 2002
and fell under your spell. I have since
moved my family here, in the hope of
sanctuary from the lifestyle I wish to
leave behind. Given my past, I do not
expect you to embrace me nor to
invite me into your daily lives. I can
only hope that, given enough time,
you may see that I have learned to
live by your example. Like you I want
my children to do better in life than
I have done, not to repeat my mis-
takes” (CIN, 17 Dec 2003, 3). Some
100 unconvinced demonstrators
marched in the capital, Avarua, openly
opposing Lyon’s effort to stay in the
Cook Islands, but the fiasco continued
when he was granted twelve-month
residency and a suspected “$150,000
payout” was revealed. It was clear
that the two major political parties
did not support the government’s
actions in this regard: the Democratic
Party condemned the government for
granting Lyon the residency permit,
and the Cook Islands Party demanded
answers over related issues. 
Rumors persisted that Lyon had
given money to assist the Democratic
Party in its reelection bid. This was
never confirmed, but the local media
did discover that Lyon had received
$100,000 of his money back, minus
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$50,000 that his lawyer, Norman
George (also a member of Parliament),
had reserved for legal coverage. Cook
Islands Prime Minister Dr Robert
Woonton’s revelation that Lyon was
one of several people interested in
purchasing the on-again, off-again
Vaima‘anga (or Sheraton) hotel pro-
ject only added to the debacle (CIN,
6 Dec 2003, 1). Amid all of this con-
fusion, Lyon traveled to Mangaia on
his “Miami Vice–style launch” and
arrived unannounced, much to the
annoyance of residents. He was asked
to leave, but damage to his boat
forced a two-week stay. To make
peace with the Mangaia people, he
donated a processor for the island’s
growers of noni fruit (Morinda citrifo-
lia). However, such acts of “inspired”
aid did not help Lyon’s situation.
After meeting with citizens concerned
about Lyon’s lifestyle and influence on
others, and reviewing allegations of
pornography, drug use, and assault,
the prime minister finally withdrew
his support and banned Lyon from
reentering the country (CIN, 16 Jan
2004, 1). Only months after calling
them wonderful and inspiring, Mark
Lyon branded the people of the Cook
Islands “boring as hell” (CIN, 12 Feb
2004, 1).
Lyon shared the media limelight
with Navy Epati, head of the Cook
Islands Ministry of Marine Resources,
whose ownership of a fishing com-
pany generated suggestions of conflict
of interest. Epati had a 70 percent
stake in Te Maroro Fishing Company
Ltd, a commercial fishing venture he
had set up in May 2003 while head
of the marine resources ministry. He
also owned half of a fish processing
company. Members of the fishing
industry later charged that Epati’s
chartered vessels were flouting rules
he was supposed to be enforcing. 
The crews of Korean vessels named
Chong Myong 701, 703, and 705
brought in by Epati’s fishing company
were accused of several irregularities,
including illegally transshipping fish—
transferring catches from one boat 
to another without registering them
(CIN, 9 Dec 2003, 1). Eventually
Epati quit his ministry post over
integrity and credibility issues. 
Another personality receiving
national political attention during the
year was Eddie Drollett, former chief
of staff to the prime minister. After
lengthy court proceedings, Drollett
admitted to illegally receiving $25,000
of taxpayer money while he was
working in the Office of the Prime
Minister (CIN, 2 July 2003, 1).
Although Parliament had relatively
few sittings, it was a busy if not ago-
nizing year for some of its members.
In July, Teina Bishop resigned as
member of Parliament for Arutanga/
Reureu/Nikaupara, Aitutaki Island,
expressing disappointment over the
budget and the inadequate allocation
for Aitutaki. In August, Geoffrey
Heather won the parliamentary seat
for Ruaau, Rarotonga, replacing his
wife Maria, who had died earlier in
the year. Just days after winning the
election, Heather was appointed
undersecretary to the prime minister,
giving him an extra $15,000 a year. In
September, the overseas seat occupied
by Dr Joseph Williams was abolished,
effective the date of the upcoming
general election. 
Visitors to the Cook Islands
included Governor General of New
Zealand Dame Silvia Cartwright and
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New Zealand First Party leader and
former Deputy Prime Minister
Winston Peters. Meanwhile, political
undercurrents continued with con-
stant realignments in allegiance—
seemingly based on personal gain—
much to the disappointment of most
Cook Islanders. Teariki Heather,
founder of a new political party,
National, joined up with the Cook
Islands Party as part of a personal
effort to win a seat in Parliament. 
In the process he shifted his intended
constituency from Ruaau to Akaoa in
Rarotonga, displacing Keu Mataroa,
an already elected cip candidate.
Mataroa subsequently abandoned
support for his party in favor of his
former opponent.
By November 2003, Dr Woonton
had become the new leader of the
Democratic Party, and efforts at uni-
fying the various factions within the
party received much support. The
goal of winning the upcoming elec-
tion, scheduled for September 2004,
was a strong driving force. However,
an attempt by some factions of the
Democratic Party and the Cook
Islands Party to unseat Prime Minis-
ter Woonton backfired, and two min-
isters (Dr Terepai Maoate and Tan-
gata Vavia) were obliged to resign.
The leadership struggle within the
Democratic Party continued into
2004. At the last party conference
before the general election, Maoate
fought off a challenge by the prime
minister to become the Democratic
Party leader by a 26–24 vote. A new
Maoate faction now in control of the
party initiated efforts to make life
more difficult for the continuing
Woonton government by challenging
constituency mp seats where possible.
Their prime target was lawyer Nor-
man George—considered to be the
“kingmaker” because of his pivotal
role in all government coalitions to
date. Businessman Eugene Tatuaava
was put forward as the Democratic
Party candidate at the September
2004 general elections in the Tenga-
tangi-Areora Ngatiarua Atiu Island
constituency, even though George 
was the incumbent. George described
efforts to oust him as the work of 
“a small breakaway of Demo funda-
mentalists” (CIN, 4 March 2004, 1),
but the pressure eventually forced him
to become an independent candidate.
The looming September 2004 election
encouraged other new developments.
Joshua Ngamatau founded a new
Republican Party to enter the 2004
general election, although it seemed 
to be offering candidates only on the
island of Aitutaki. And in spite of
public pressure to create more party
loyalty, the cabinet resisted reform
efforts. It appeared to the general
public that the cabinet wanted mem-
bers of Parliament to continue chang-
ing parties without penalties.
Lack of penalties also emerged as
an issue at the regional level. The
Cook Islands has always willingly
committed trained personnel and
financial resources to the South
Pacific Regional Environment Pro-
gram (sprep), based in Sämoa, and
even provided its first administrative
head. So the dismissal of senior sprep
officer I‘o Tuakeu-Lindsay came as a
surprise to many. A former Cook
Islands Environment Services director
and a well-known hardworking pro-
fessional, Tuakeu-Lindsay was one of
two women sacked by sprep Director
General Asterio Takesy. She and the
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other woman, a Samoan, accused
Takesy of sexual harassment (CIN, 17
March 2004, 1). The Samoan govern-
ment expressed displeasure at Takesy’s
actions and demanded an investiga-
tion, but the Cook Islands govern-
ment showed little interest. While
Takesy may have had legitimate
reasons for his actions, the lack of
follow-up from the Cook Islands
undermined an opportunity to clear
the matter appropriately.
Perhaps Cook Islands government
interest was more focused on regional
security and national developmental
issues. At the 2004 Pacific Islands
Forum meeting, the prime minister
expressed support for the idea that the
Forum Island countries create stronger
and deeper links. Other issues consid-
ered important included environmen-
tal concerns, transport links, role of
women, decision-making, elimination
of domestic violence, human rights,
and the needs of youth. Forum lead-
ers agreed that the Pacific should (1)
assess options and provide for deeper
and broader regional cooperation,
taking into account the wider inter-
national agreements in which forum
countries participate; (2) identify
areas where resource-sharing and
policy alignment would yield the best
results for the region; and (3) provide
clear recommendations to leaders on
the sequence and priorities for inten-
sified regional cooperation (CIN, 7
April 2004, 1).
The return in 2003 of three Cook
Islands policemen who served in the
Regional Assistance Mission to the
Solomon Islands (ramsi), and the
commitment of more Cook Islands
personnel, marked an important ele-
ment of Cook Islands regional partici-
pation. The Cook Islands does not
maintain a military force, and the
involvement of its police force in a
regional defensive role was a chal-
lenging and historical step. An inci-
dent in Holland also brought world-
wide attention to the Cook Islands
and its police when a visiting Dutch
citizen, Karen Harvey, requested
Cook Islands police protection from
underworld gangs in Holland. Her
husband had been arrested by the
Dutch police for kidnapping a mil-
lionaire’s seventeen-year-old son and
demanding a $19-million ransom.
Harvey claimed that her husband 
had been forced into the crime by 
an underworld gang (CIN, 19 Dec
2003, 1).
During the year under review police
began using radar traps to counter
speeding on the road, and business-
man Teanaroa Worthington appeared
before Justice Norman Smith for
smuggling shoes in from Hawai‘i
(CIN, 9 July 2003, 1). Well-known
writer Alistair Te Ariki Campell
returned to the Cook Islands to visit
his home island of Penrhyn; Janice
Nicholas became the latest local
woman to win the Miss South Pacific
title; and Pukapuka held its third
annual global conference for people
from that island. 
Hundreds attended the funeral of
Niki Smith, daughter of wealthy busi-
nessman Ewan Smith, the owner of
Air Rarotonga (Air Raro). The tragic
motorcycle accident in which she died
highlighted an ongoing problem with
drinking and driving on the roads of
Rarotonga, and the lack of an efficient
first aid accident response capacity.
The accident precipitated major
efforts to begin an air ambulance
“angel” service. 
Another incident that had wider
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ramifications involved rugby, the
country’s national sport. Referees had
lodged a complaint with the Cook
Islands Rugby Union over an incident
in which player Tu Potoru had
splashed water on referee Simiona
Teotu while Junior Areai had struck
the match official with his hat. When
the Rugby Union dismissed the com-
plaint, the Rarotonga Referees Associ-
ation expressed their disappointment
by calling a historic boycott of the
annual Town and Country games. 
A conflict over the Pa Ariki and
Makea Ariki chiefly titles in Raro-
tonga, and over various subchiefly
titles, suggested that monetary inter-
ests linked to land were taking prece-
dence over traditional concerns with
family and sharing. Another para-
mount chief on Rarotonga, Tinomana
Ruta, had already leased out several
blocks of land in her capacity as Ariki,
often over the strong objection of
legitimate landowners.
The increased involvement of the
Chinese government in major develop-
ment projects was very obvious dur-
ing 2003–2004. A multimillion-dollar
Chinese commitment to the construc-
tion of the Cook Islands Ministry of
Justice offices and courthouse in
Rarotonga drew much interest on the
island. Awareness was amplified when
work finally began on the downtown
courthouse on 29 October 2003, with
about forty imported Chinese gov-
ernment workers assisting in the con-
struction. People’s Republic of China
Premier Wen Jiahao told visiting
Prime Minister Woonton, “China is
ready to enhance friendly relations
with all South Pacific nations includ-
ing the Cook Islands.” He declared
that “by providing the Cook Islands
with assistance China had gained
economic and social benefit from it.”
Wen also expressed appreciation for 
a Cook Islands commitment to the
one-China policy. Other discussions
focused on a $4.8-million Rarotonga
courthouse, as well as a new police
station that the Chinese offered to
fund and build. The Cook Islands
prime minister expressed appreciation
for China’s equal treatment of small
countries such as the Cook Islands
(CIN, 29 April 2004, 1).
Chinese interest in the Cook
Islands extended to the private sector.
A Chinese company (privately owned
but headed by a government official)
placed a bid to take over the export
of black pearls from the Cook
Islands. The value of pearl exports
had dropped from $18.3 million in
2000 to only $6.4 million in 2002
(CIN, 21 July 2003, 1). China offered
to pay $40 to $50 apiece, compared
to Japan’s current purchases at $30
apiece. That interest has yet to
materialize.
In August, a New Zealand surveil-
lance plane spotted two fishing ves-
sels, suspected to be Taiwanese long-
liners, inside the exclusive economic
zone of the Cook Islands. A month
later, the fishing vessel Young Duk
ceased operation due to mechanical
problems and the financial difficulties
of its owner, making it the second
vessel to sit idle in the main harbor 
of Avatiu (CIN, 29 Sep 2003, 1). By
October, the Mahr-Leena, another
fishing vessel operating out of the
Cook Islands, had gone into receiver-
ship (CIN, 20 Oct 2003, 1), and in
February 2004 the Walara K tried to
leave the country without settling
outstanding debts. To make matters
worse, fishing giant Sealord pulled out
of the Cook Islands only nine months
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after declaring itself the leader in the
development of the fishing industry
there. Hawkes Bay Fisheries also with-
drew from the country. Representa-
tives of both companies declared that
the strong value of the New Zealand
dollar affected the price of catches
(CIN, 10 April 2004, 1). In response
to these developments, Temu Okotai,
a leading Cook Islands businessman,
called for the Pacific region to regu-
late the price of tuna in overseas mar-
kets—by catching less. “Catch rates
are calculated on what is sustainable,
but I think there’s another measure
and that is how much fish is needed
to get a decent return” (CIN, 19
March 2004, 1).
Unlike the fishing industry, tourism
continued its strong development.
New Zealand and Europe still repre-
sented the strongest tourism markets
for the Cook Islands. By the end of
October 2003, some 21,104 New
Zealand tourists had visited, followed
by United Kingdom/Europe with
17,623, and Australia with 8,810.
Interestingly, of those coming from
New Zealand, 2,090 were actually
Cook Islanders living in New Zealand
—a reminder that many more Cook
Islanders live in New Zealand than in
the Islands (CIN, 30 Dec 2003, 1).
However, only 17,067 tourists came
during the first three months of 2004,
a reduction of some 1,143 compared
to the same period in 2003 (CIN, 18
May 2004, 1).
Although most visitors stayed in
Rarotonga, an increasing number
visited the outer islands, particularly
Aitutaki. In an effort to further
expand the visitor industry in Aitu-
taki, a new international airport
opened there during the year. How-
ever, the huge expenditure on the
airport attracted much criticism. Most
critics saw it as an excuse to assist the
privately owned Air Raro at taxpayer
expense. The newly sealed runway
dramatically reduces the maintenance
costs of Air Raro, and there is appar-
ently little possibility that global
carriers will use the Aitutaki “inter-
national runway” on a regular basis.
Tourism development in Aitutaki
underlines the need to control opera-
tors and monitor environmental
impacts. In July 2003, a tour boat
visiting the smaller island capsized,
injuring several of its passengers. The
island council began to look at new
bylaws to regulate such activities. A
proposed Captain Cook Hotel devel-
opment for Aitutaki was also heavily
criticized for its potential impact on
the environment. The development 
of necessary infrastructure, including
systems for solid and liquid waste
disposal and water supply, has not
kept pace with tourism development
projects, which seem to be spiraling
out of control.
Such environmental concern is also
evident on the main island of Raro-
tonga, where most tourists visit. Calls
for a full environmental impact assess-
ment were not uncommon during
2003–2004, and the need for such
studies was validated by the reported
erosion at the Rarotongan Resort, one
of the oldest and largest accommoda-
tions on the island. Increased tourism
has generally placed a strain on the
Rarotonga resources, but problems
with pollution, water, and general
infrastructure have not dampened
the government’s drive to increase
the volume of tourist traffic into the
Cook Islands. Royal Tongan Airlines
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inaugurated service during the year,
although their regular flights did not
last long. Air New Zealand and Aloha
Airlines continued their Cook Islands
operations while the viability of a
national airline was again considered.
Pacific Smart Saver fares were avail-
able on Air New Zealand flights to
New Zealand, Fiji, and Australia,
offering up to 35 percent off the regu-
lar economy fare. Although the fare
cuts were designed to increase tour-
ism, there was concern that they
would also add to an already massive
out-migration of Cook Islanders.
Ironically, as the growth of tourism
increases job opportunities, more
Cook Islanders have been leaving the
country. Undaunted, the government
has tried to meet the needs of tourist-
related trades by establishing training
schemes. The signing of a memoran-
dum of understanding between the
Cook Islands Hospitality and Tour-
ism Training Center and the Univer-
sity of the South Pacific Institute of
Technology was seen by Prime Min-
ister Woonton as a historic step. It
allowed for a large number of train-
ing schemes designed to create jobs
and stem the outflow of young peo-
ple. Nonetheless, the high cost of
living in the Cook Islands, relatively
low wages, and increased demand for
cheaper contract labor from overseas
continue to discourage locals from
staying.
The growing tourism industry also
impacts the environment in a variety
of ways. In a historical legal action,
Gerald Garnier and his wife Marie-
France Cowan were granted occupa-
tion rights on Motu Tapu, in spite of
strong opposition from the commu-
nity and many landowners (CIN, 12
March 2004, 1). The incident raised
fears about anticipated damage to this
particular motu (small island) from
human settlement, the growing inac-
cessibility of what was once available
to the extended family and other peo-
ple, and the impact of the decision in
setting a precedent in Rarotonga.
The people of Rarotonga have also
been concerned about environmental
issues not caused by human activities.
These included toxins thriving in
Muri Lagoon and an unidentified
problem in the waters close to the
village of Titikaveka, which has
caused health problems and reduced
the number of visitors to the area.
These problems prompted the Tapo-
roporo Ipukarea Society to call on
government to ratify the UN Stock-
holm Convention, which is designed
to address the problem of organic
pollutants—the suspected culprit in
Titikaveka. 
The Cook Islands remained on an
international money-laundering black-
list. By 4 June 2004, in the Cook
Islands and elsewhere, operators of
offshore companies, banks, insurers,
and trust accounts must make full
disclosures and comply with the same
procedures and principles (CIN, 28
Feb 2004, 1). A new law removing
certain protection provisions in off-
shore banking operations was
adopted, moving the country toward
compliance. New Financial Action
Task Force rules call for information
on the capital adequacy of offshore
institutions, detail prudential require-
ments, as well as on-site inspections
and a physical presence. A top-level
Indian politician is among those ren-
dered vulnerable by the new require-
ments. Parkash Singh Badal, former
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chief minister of the Indian state of
Punjab, has been under scrutiny for
allegedly laundering millions of dol-
lars through the Cook Islands (CIN,
16 Oct 2003, 1). The country’s off-
shore banking industry is also impli-
cated in the disputed takeover of
English premier league soccer club
Chelsea by Russian billionaire Roman
Abrahamnivich for $388 million. An
investigation revealed that the Cook
Islands–based company Ceranites
held five million shares in the Chelsea
club (CIN, 29 July 2003, 1). In yet
another incident, the state-owned
Bank Negara Indonesia was swindled
out of us$300 million by two export-
ers who were reportedly given loans
using letters of credit issued in Kenya,
Switzerland, and the Cook Islands
(CIN, 13 Nov 2003, 1).
During the year, government pur-
sued other, new revenue-generating
activities. In an effort to raise funds
locally for the Aitutaki airport run-
way upgrade, the government tried 
to implement a $20 landing tax for
flights between Rarotonga and Aitu-
taki. The tax proposal proved very
unpopular with Aitutaki residents,
who pointed out that the landowners
at the airport site were not compen-
sated, and that most residents had
not requested the project in the first
place. The proposal was eventually
scrapped, but as much as $20,000
had already been expended on pre-
paring Rarotonga airport and buying
thousands of “free paid” stickers for
the proposed Aitutaki landing tax
(CIN, 2 Oct 2003, 1).
The Cook Islands government
acknowledged that the cost of living
increased by 2 percent in 2003.
(Inflation is measured by checking 
the prices of various goods in the
consumer price index [cpi] and shows
how quickly prices are rising.) The
highest increases came in the housing
category (including rents and mainte-
nance costs), which jumped by 4.2
percent, and in miscellaneous goods
and services, which rose 5.15 percent
(CIN, 24 May 2004, 1). The inflation
problems faced by the average Cook
Islander were exacerbated by over-
pricing in many stores. Four months
after the price order came into effect
on 26 February 2004, price inspector
Helen Maunga said that “most of the
46 shops visited so far were found to
have breached the price order” (CIN,
28 May 2004, 1).
During the year, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (adb) announced two
loans totaling us$5.3 million for the
country over the next three years. The
loans were to fund improvements to
the power supply on Rarotonga, as
well as water projects on Aitutaki and
Rarotonga (CIN, 15 Aug 2003, 1). A
number of factors, including the Iraq
war and the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (sars) scare, caused the
bank to revise its projection of overall
economic growth downward from
3.2 per cent to only 0.2 percent 
(CIN, 7 Oct 2003, 1).
The adb readjustment underlined
the vulnerability of small economies
such as that of the Cook Islands.
While the politicians continued to
portray an image of economic success,
boasting that there were more jobs
available than there were job seekers,
most locals were emigrating out of
the country, and the number of for-
eign workers taking up positions
continued to increase. The growing
number of foreign permanent resi-
dents who are automatically eligible
to participate fully in parliamentary
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elections suggests a potential for
dramatic changes to the judicial
system and land laws. Unless such
issues are addressed, the future for 
the ethnic Mäori of the Cook Islands
looks uncertain. 
jon tikivanotau m jonassen
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French Polynesia
Two overriding issues stand out in the
past year or so in French Polynesia:
another change of statute, this time 
to a supposedly more autonomous
“overseas country” of France rather
than an “overseas territory,” and a
surprising assembly election in May
2004, which ended the twenty-year
reign of Gaston Flosse as president
and brought into office his longtime
pro-independence rival, Oscar
Temaru. No local leader, however,
can easily escape the harsh reality of
severe economic dependency caused
by the introduction of nuclear testing
in the 1960s. French military spending
distorted the communal Polynesian
society and created a middle class that
fed on French-subsidized government
jobs and patronage and enriched itself
through corrupt business monopolies
and real estate investments at the
expense of the laboring majority.
French Polynesia, whose capital
Papeete is on the populous main
island of Tahiti, is still in quest of a
post-nuclear economy, since French
funding for the former Centre d’Ex-
perimentation du Pacifique (cep)
ended in the late 1990s. France con-
tinues to transfer massive aid for
development, as much as us$1 billion
a year (PIR, 26 Aug 2002). Flosse
built himself a monumental presiden-
tial palace that houses “623 employ-
ees and courtiers” and invested public
money in many grandiose projects in
Tahiti and overseas, but Temaru’s
demand for a referendum on inde-
pendence is necessarily tempered by 
a vision of ongoing French subsidies
and compensation for the impact of
nuclear testing. Editor Alex W du Prel
of Tahiti-Pacifique Magazine called
the situation a “social and economic
fiasco” due to “cut and paste pro-
grams prepared in Paris for a great
industrial country, which French
Polynesia is certainly not.” The Flosse
administration, which du Prel said
encouraged only a “consumer society
of privileges, of ecological looting 
and corporatist castes [and] above 
all made the rich more rich and
marginalized the part of the popula-
tion that remained authentic,” at one
point even asked the local people for
“fresh ideas” (TPM, July 2004).
The number one local industry
remained tourism. In 2003, the
number of visitors was over 200,000
(nearly equaling the local population),
which represented a recovery from the
negative impact of the events of 11
September 2001 on air travel. North
America, and mainly the United
States, provided the largest number of
visitors, with 77,000 or 40 percent of
the market (and also the largest single
increase over 2002, about 25 percent);
it was followed closely by Europe,
with 74,000 or 38 percent of the
market; then Japan with 20,000
(10 percent); Australia, New Zealand,
and New Caledonia with 16,000 (8
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percent); and South America (mainly
Chile) with 3,800 (2 percent). Despite
special efforts to cater to the Japanese
market, such as increasing Tahiti Nui
service to three flights a week to
Osaka and Tokyo and holding a
scuba-diving exhibition, the number
of Japanese visitors—mainly wedding
couples (who spend on average twice
as much as other tourists and espe-
cially enjoy the over-the-water bunga-
lows for honeymoons)—did not quite
match the previous year (PIR, 4 April
2003; 5 Jan 2004).
The number two industry, cultured
black pearls from the Tuamotu atolls,
declined drastically in 2003, as prices
dropped by 80 percent. Despite gov-
ernment regulatory reforms aimed at
controlling quality, informal trading
to foreign buyers evaded taxes and
undercut sellers. The local govern-
ment continued to promote tuna fish-
ing, by increasing the country’s fleet
size, as well as vanilla production, 
a once-profitable export for which
world prices were increasing (PIR,
24 June 2002; 18 Feb, 13 May, 10
June 2003). State-funded infrastruc-
ture construction continued to grow,
and scholarships for overseas training
increased, but government efforts to
curb rising deficits in public health
insurance and civil service pension
funds pushed doctors to strike for
a month in 2003 over reduced pay-
ments, while public workers demon-
strated against extending the required
number of years for pension contri-
butions (PIR, 1 May, 29 May, 9 June,
12 Aug 2003).
French Polynesia has received
several statutes of autonomy, notably
in 1977 and 1984, but French notions
of “autonomy” are usually defined
through the lens of a political system
that is more highly centralized than
many others in the western world.
Although the relationship between
French Polynesia and Paris has been
described as “similar to that of the
Cook Islands and New Zealand” 
(De Deckker 1994, 272), many would
dispute just how “self-governing”
Papeete really is. Temaru complained
that France still controlled foreign
relations, immigration, external
communications, currency, finance,
defense, courts and police, and higher
education, among other things (1988,
279–282). Flosse managed to get the
statute changed twice, first in 1984
when he became president of the 
new government (and New Caledonia
was in rebellion), and in 1996 after
the last round of nuclear tests and
anticolonial protests, when more
nationalist symbolism was added
(Von Strokirch 2001). In 1998, when
New Caledonia’s Noumea Accord
promised gradually expanding auton-
omy with a prospect of voting on
independence, Flosse proposed fur-
ther expansion of French Polynesia’s
autonomy, to include the favoring of
local citizens in hiring and establish-
ing businesses, as well as increasing
the authority of the president and
Territorial Assembly (ta). French
President Jacques Chirac agreed in
May 1999, and negotiations began
over a new statute that would confer
the high-sounding but ambiguous
label of “overseas country” within 
the French republic (PIR, 1 June 
1999; Von Strokirch 2000).
During a visit to Papeete in August
2002, French Overseas Territories
Minister Brigitte Girardin said, “With-
out French Polynesia, France would
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not be a great power, and France
never failed to help Tahiti when
needed.” She promised more financial
support from the post-nuclear Eco-
nomic Restructuring Fund created in
1996, tax exemptions to encourage
outside investment, and “new politi-
cal evolution” that would upgrade
local administrative power so that
new French laws would not infringe
on bills passed by the local assembly
as long as the latter conformed to the
French constitution and the European
Union courts. Flosse, a career Gaullist
closely allied with Chirac (who had
been newly reelected in 2002), com-
plained about the meddling in French
Polynesian lawmaking by the previous
Socialist government in Paris, but he
got along well with Gaullist Premier
Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who supported
his desire to expand self-government.
“Independence would lead to dicta-
torship and misery,” Flosse said,
“[but] our autonomy statute was
meant to evolve” (PIR, 24 June,
24 Aug 2002). By March 2003, 
the French Parliament passed some
“decentralization” amendments to the
constitution, which called overseas
territories “overseas collectivities.”
Flosse said he would request a further
name change to “overseas country”
and sponsor an organic law that
would allow the French Polynesian
Territorial Assembly to pass its own
“laws of the country,” protect local
job hiring, enable French Polynesia
to share more governing powers with
Paris, and contest any new French
laws that interfered with its own
authority (PIR, 20 March, 27 May,
7 July 2003).
In July 2003, the Territorial Assem-
bly began to debate the proposed new
statute but Flosse wanted to limit the
discussion of its 194 articles to only
four days. The opposition threatened
to boycott the proceedings if all the
articles were not debated, since the
new laws would affect the territory for
decades, but Flosse’s absolute major-
ity of 28 of 49 ta seats passed the
statute as he wished, while the oppo-
sition sang a nationalist song in the
public gallery in protest (PIR, 2 July,
7 July 2003). Flosse also wanted Paris
to grant French Polynesia a second
senatorial seat in the French Parlia-
ment by 2004, in order to mimic 
New Caledonia, but the additional
seat will not take effect until 2007
(PIR, 14 July 2003). Also in July,
Chirac came to the South Pacific,
visiting not only the French territories
but also anglophone ex-colonies and
powers. He said that he wanted
France to be a “player” in the region’s
security and development, one that
could provide additional assistance
directly or through the European
Union. Old superpower rivalries were
a thing of the past, he said, and now
a spirit of cooperation should guide
the Pacific countries. He supported
Australia’s intervention in Solomon
Islands, but Prime Minister John
Howard was reluctant to allow
France to take part in that peace-
keeping operation in order to avoid
making the exercise appear “neo-
colonial” (PIR, 3 July, 29 July 2003).
Chirac suggested that French Poly-
nesia be given observer status at the
Pacific Islands Forum, as New Caledo-
nia had, but at their Auckland meet-
ing the Forum countries expressed
mixed feelings. Temaru and Rock
Wamytan of New Caledonia had
criticized France’s “checkbook diplo-
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macy” and warned that the Flosse
regime was a “Trojan horse” for
French interests. Unlike New Caledo-
nia, whose Noumea Accord specifi-
cally mentioned the prospect of inde-
pendence, French Polynesia’s new
statute contained no such option, 
and Temaru countered Flosse’s anti-
independence ploy by continuing to
call for his country to be inscribed on
the United Nations decolonization list
(PIR, 25 July, 4 Aug, 22 Aug 2003;
abc, 15 Aug 2003; IB, May 2004).
In Papeete, Chirac said that
because Polynesia had hosted nuclear
tests for thirty years, France was for-
ever in its debt and would provide the
territory with about us$150 million 
a year in compensation for “lost rev-
enues.” In response to protests during
his visit by people from the contami-
nated atolls of Moruroa and Fanga-
taufa, he also said that France would
take responsibility for any test-related
health problems if proof could be
provided that such a link existed (PIR,
28 July, 29 July 2003). In fact, the
director of France’s Atomic Energy
Commission, René Pellat, had already
admitted in May 1999 that the nuclear
tests had caused cracks in the coral
atolls, and since August 2002 former
French Pacific test site workers had
been demanding a complete medical
investigation into their abnormally
high rates of cancer (PIR, 5 May
1999; 21 Aug 2002). Instead, Chirac
presided at a France-Oceania Summit
in Papeete that was attended by the
leaders of twenty Pacific Island coun-
tries, where he promised to double
France’s Pacific Fund for financial aid:
“Oceania is today at the heart of a
new basin of world development.”
Flosse donated another us$1 million
of French Polynesia’s “own” money
to the fund, though he was already
under investigation for trying to
spread influence by “humanitarian”
aid giving in the region (PIR, 30 July,
4 Aug, 8 Aug, 12 Nov 2003; NC,
30 July 2003).
In late November 2003, the oppo-
sition in the Territorial Assembly
criticized Flosse’s deficit spending, in
particular an additional us$1 million
requested by the president and his
cabinet to cover “outside works and
services” and “subsidies to diverse
associations.” Nicole Bouteau called
that waste “scandalous,” and Tamara
Bopp-Duppont of Tavini said it was
“shameful,” adding, “You throw
public money out the windows. When
will you think of the little people?”
Meanwhile, French military veterans
were joined by a Polynesian associa-
tion, Moruroa e Tatou, in filing a for-
mal lawsuit, backed by the French
Green and Communist parties, against
the French state for “involuntary
homicide” by exposing nuclear test
site workers to harmful radiation 
(NT, 29 Nov 2003). Despite his
history of corruption convictions,
revenge against media criticism, and
well-known clientelism (Von Strokirch
2002; Le Monde, 22 May 2004),
Flosse continued to push the new
statute through French legislative 
and legal channels until the Senate
approved it just before Christmas. 
He also called for public bids to con-
struct, at government expense (“out-
side works”?), a statue of Charles de
Gaulle in the garden outside his presi-
dential palace (PIR, 31 Oct, 11 Dec,
19 Dec 2003).
In January 2004, the French
National Assembly approved the 
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new autonomy statute, which Flosse
vowed would allow French Polynesia
to establish its own diplomatic and
trade missions abroad to promote
economic growth. His opponents
countered that it would also concen-
trate more power in his own office, to
the point of allowing the head of the
government to propose laws without
ta initiative and making it theoreti-
cally possible for the president to be
chosen without consulting the assem-
bly, thus creating a quasi-monarchy
without a popular referendum (PIR,
31 Oct 2003; 16 Jan, 30 Jan 2004).
While awaiting the final verdict of the
Constitutional Council in Paris, some
French legislators lodged an appeal
against the new statute, arguing that
it vested too much power in the terri-
torial president (PIR, 4 Feb 2004).
Flosse had argued for a strong, stable
executive that could run the country
effectively and represent it abroad,
much as in France; in 1958, de Gaulle
had created a strong presidency with
emergency powers when the Fifth
French Republic replaced the weak,
coalition-bound Fourth Republic. But
socialists and even some Gaullists saw
danger in creating a potential banana
republic in Papeete. The president of
French Polynesia, they warned, as
opposed to the ta-elected president
of the government of French Polyne-
sia, might someday be chosen directly
by the people and thus bypass the
established democratic process, as in
some African ex-colonies. Defenders
of Flosse in the French Parliament
said it would be “neo-colonial” to 
do otherwise, but Socialist Deputy
René Dosière said, “This ‘presiden-
tialization’ is not a good thing for
Overseas, any more than it is good
for the métropole [mother country]”
(TPM, March 2004).
Flosse assured his metropolitan
backers and local loyalists that
expanded autonomy was definitely
“not a first step towards indepen-
dence. French Polynesia wants to
remain French. It is French, it is even
more French than Polynesian.” In
early March, the Constitutional
Council formally approved the revised
autonomy statute, but it also deleted
key provisions, such as restricting
land tenure in French Polynesia to
local-born inhabitants or their descen-
dants, putting police under local gov-
ernment control, and granting the
local government the right to hold 
a referendum without French permis-
sion. Most importantly, it deleted a
provision allowing the Territorial
Assembly to pass “laws of the coun-
try” without prior approval from the
French Parliament—New Caledonia
received that last power in 1999, but
the now-country of French Polynesia
would not (PIR, 5 March 2004). In
the March 2004 issue of Tahiti-
Pacifique Magazine, du Prel published
a detailed analysis that revealed sev-
eral points about which Flosse seemed
less than candid. First, the term “over-
seas country” meant nothing in
French constitutional law, so it was
only a cosmetic name change, as was
the change in title of ta members
from “territorial counselors” to
“representatives” (Flosse had wanted
“deputies”). The provisions for recog-
nizing and preserving Tahitian iden-
tity were essentially already part of
the previous statute, and the Tahitian
language had become co-equal to
French in court proceedings the previ-
ous year. The “country” government
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could “participate” with the French
State in a list of powers over the terri-
tory but not control them unilaterally;
foreign relations conducted by French
Polynesia still had to have the
approval of Paris; and, as Girardin
had made a point of emphasizing to
the Senate, “laws of the country”
were simply “administrative acts,”
which did not carry the same author-
ity as those in New Caledonia. The
local government could, however,
practice affirmative action in favoring
local residents in hiring, and the presi-
dent of the country could name his
own cabinet of ministers, with the
approval of only the French High
Commissioner (not of the elected
assembly, as in New Caledonia) (TPM,
March 2004). In a sense, Flosse was
really seeking more autonomy for
himself, not necessarily for French
Polynesia, except in some nationalis-
tic-sounding terminology.
What was perhaps more significant
was the modification of the electoral
laws, by means of amendments
slipped into the statute by Flosse
without any discussion in the French
Parliament. The number of ta seats
expanded from 49 to 57, giving 5
more to the populous Windward
Islands (Tahiti and Moorea), 1 more
to the Leeward Islands (Huahine,
Raiatea, Bora Bora), 2 more to the
Tuamotus-Gambiers (which were
divided into two districts with 3 seats
each), but the Australs or Marquesas
would retain 3 seats each. Although
the Tuamotus received 2 more seats
and the Leeward Islands 1, and Flosse
was most popular in the rural outer
islands where he was born (the
Gambiers), the increase of 5 seats in
the urban Windward Islands, which
already had 32 (three-quarters of 
the total population lived in Tahiti-
Moorea), actually favored Temaru’s
Tavini Huiraatira, by 37–20 or a net
gain of 2 seats. The new rules also
gave a one-third “bonus” of seats to
whichever list won the majority in a
district and set a minimum of 3 per-
cent of votes cast to win a seat in the
assembly, theoretically eliminating the
need for a second round runoff vote
and enabling larger, stable majorities
to rule the country (TPM, March
2004).
Also in March 2004, only two
years after he had crushed the left 
in his reelection to the French presi-
dency, Chirac’s party experienced a
disaster in the metropolitan regional
elections, losing twelve out of four-
teen regions that it had previously
controlled. This amounted to a very
negative referendum on Premier Raf-
farin’s administration, in part because
of a sagging economy (L’Express, 29
March 2004). In spite of this setback
to his patron in Paris (or perhaps
because of it), Flosse urged Chirac’s
cabinet to dissolve the French Polyne-
sian Territorial Assembly and call for
new elections two years early, arguing
that the change of statute made new
elections appropriate, as in 1985
(PIR, 7 April 2004). Temaru’s Tavini
Huiraatira party, which in 2001 had
won only ten out of forty-nine ta
seats, joined with three other opposi-
tion parties in requesting that the
French Council of State delay the new
election, but to no avail. Tavini then
formed coalition lists of candidates
with the pro-independence parties
Ai‘a Api, Here Ai‘a, and Ia Mana 
Te Nunaa. In May, this Union for
Democracy (upd) organized marches
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into Papeete of about 6,000 people,
who rallied around the statue of
Tahitian nationalist Pouvanaa a Oopa
outside the ta hall. “Our objective,”
Temaru said, “is to do like the French
in France during the recent regional
elections–to overturn the government
in place and install a political
change.” The French Socialists, who
had just made a comeback in the
regional elections, signed a partner-
ship agreement with Tavini (PIR, 21
April, 3 May, 17 May 2004; TPM,
June 2004). Temaru said that the
upd had only one opponent in the
election, Flosse’s Tahoeraa Huiraatira
party, and he denounced the “abuses
and waste of a single man” (Le
Monde, 21 May 2004).
On 23 May, 78 percent of regis-
tered voters went to the polls, an
increase of 10 percent over the 2001
election. Flosse’s gathering of one
thousand supporters in his palace
took heart when Tahoeraa Huiraatira
won most of the outer islands (whose
polls closed earlier), and it wound up
with twenty-eight seats, more than
any other party. But the upd won
twenty-seven, due mainly to votes in
the Windward Islands, which left two
autonomists holding the balance.
Flosse had been president for twenty
years, but this outcome threatened his
status as a pillar for Chirac overseas;
in fact, Jacques Lafleur of New Cale-
donia had already met defeat earlier
in the month. Flosse had scoffed at
the upd marches but now called for 
a referendum on independence to
remind voters of what Temaru really
stood for. Equally ironic, Temaru 
said on television that independence
needed to be prepared for, especially
economically, for another ten or
fifteen years (a formula similar to 
that proposed in New Caledonia’s
Noumea Accord). There appeared to
be a stalemate, since neither Tahoeraa
nor Tavini-upd had a clear majority,
but the two small autonomist parties,
Philip Schyle’s Fetia Api and Nicole
Bouteau’s No Oe E Te Nunaa, did 
not want to ally with Flosse (PIR,
26 May 2004).
Chirac’s cabinet in Paris was not
amused by the prospect of another
defeat overseas, after the surprising
defeat earlier that month of pro-
Chirac lists in both Guadeloupe and
New Caledonia, as well as a setback
in the French Antilles in December
2003 (where voters in Martinique and
Guadeloupe had been asked to choose
between their present “department”
status and a vaguely defined unifica-
tion of the two entities with more
autonomy; they had rejected the
“unknown” details). Chirac’s political
empire overseas, like his party struc-
ture in France, depended on very per-
sonal ties to loyal clients—despite the
problems that arose from subsidizing
a class of overpaid civil servants and
politicians with “free money” from
the “big mother hen,” as journalist
Eric Conan put it, and thus promot-
ing economic dependency instead of
production (L’Express, 27 Nov 2003;
28 June 2004). Girardin warned the
Socialists not to celebrate prematurely
over the upd success in the election
and, according to the newspaper La
Dépêche de Tahiti, she told Flosse
that France would “turn off the taps”
if Temaru took power (Girardin later
denied that quote and said she was
only concerned about the negative
effect on outside investment if the
pro-independence leader won). When
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Flosse claimed that the upd success
had “opened a crisis,” Girardin sent
300 extra police to Papeete—in order,
she told Dosière in the National
Assembly, to ensure a “serene” cli-
mate for the electoral process (PIR,
28 May, 3 June, 4 June, 9 June 2004).
Flosse said on television that the
election results had only expressed a
warning from the people, not a real
desire to get rid of him (abc, 1 June
2004). Wallis and Futuna’s senator in
Paris, Robert Laufoaulu (who repre-
sented the pro-Chirac government of
that very dependent overseas terri-
tory), wrote a letter of support to
Flosse, calling the election result
“unfair” but urging him to learn 
from it and “rectify your policies”
(PIR, 4 June 2004).
The first test of which party would
find enough allies to muster a major-
ity in the assembly was the election 
of the ta president on 3 June. Both
sides courted partners, but Schyle and
Bouteau decided to support the upd
against Flosse. Those two autonomist
votes should have given the upd the
twenty-nine-seat majority it needed to
elect Antony Géros as ta president.
But Emile Vernaudon, who had been
on the upd list in the May elections
but was also a former Flosse ally,
oddly ran as the Tahoeraa candidate
in the ta ballot, a move that even the
official French media called a “desta-
bilization” maneuver. With Vernau-
don’s crossover, the upd needed an
additional vote from Chantal Flores
of the Austral Islands to elect Géros,
29–28, to cries of joy in the public
gallery. Schyle and Bouteau said they
would also support Temaru’s candi-
dacy for president of French Polynesia
but did not immediately agree to be
part of the upd. Flosse then tried
another maneuver: he did not apply
to run for the presidency by the
required deadline and instead said he
would appeal to the French Council
of State to nullify the 3 June election
of ta officers, which he said violated
“public rights and liberties” by not
giving Tahoeraa five of the ten posi-
tions. He would also try to have an
administrative tribunal postpone the
presidential election, which was
scheduled for 10 June. The Council 
of State quickly rejected the first
petition, and Temaru won election 
to the new presidency on 14 June—
unopposed, with thirty votes, and
against a Tahoeraa boycott. He said
he still wanted independence but
would wait ten to twenty years until
the “political, economic and social
conditions are ripe” to seek it (PIR,
4 June, 8 June, 9 June, 15 June 2004;
RFO, 7 June 2004).
Because Temaru had to depend on
the support of autonomist or indepen-
dent parties to keep his ta majority,
and opinion polls showed that the
majority of the population of French
Polynesia did not support complete
independence, he said he would ask
France to negotiate an agreement
similar to New Caledonia’s Noumea
Accord of 1998, which gave that
autonomous territory the right to
organize a self-determination referen-
dum after fifteen to twenty years. He
also supported Flosse’s efforts to
adopt the Euro as the local currency
instead of French Pacific francs, and
vowed to promote tourism and cul-
tured pearl sales to boost the local
economy (abc, 16 June 2004). By
mid-June, he announced his presiden-
tial cabinet, which he reduced almost
in half, from sixteen to nine min-
istries, in order to cut administrative
political reviews • polynesia 201
costs. Temaru himself took charge of
foreign relations and municipal devel-
opment, with Jacqui Drollet of the
pro-independence Ia Mana Te Nunaa
as vice president and minister of tour-
ism, the environment, air transport,
and handicrafts. Other cabinet mem-
bers included Emile Vanfasse, a retired
official of the French revenue depart-
ment in Paris, who became minister of
finance and commerce; Jean-Marius
Raapoto, a Tahitian language profes-
sor, who became minister of educa-
tion, culture, youth, and language
policy; Keitapu Maamaatuaiahutapu,
a marine biology professor, who
became minister of natural resources,
the pearl industry, fishing, and farm-
ing; and the lone woman on the team,
Marie-Laure Vanizette, who became
minister of health, human services,
and women’s affairs. The resilient
Vernaudon became minister of com-
munications, decentralization, outer
islands, and sports (PIR, 17 June
2004; TP, 6 July 2004).
Temaru hoped to gain observer
status at the Pacific Islands Forum
meeting in Apia in August 2004,
because he wanted the Forum’s help
in gaining independence for his coun-
try, including support for getting
French Polynesia onto the United
Nations decolonization list the way
New Caledonia had been added after
the Kanak uprising in the 1980s (PIR,
21 June 2004). He also planned to
travel to Europe in July, to meet with
Chirac and Girardin to discuss devel-
opment aid, nuclear compensation,
and decentralization, and to discuss
the Euro issue with European Union
officials in Brussels (PIR, 22 June
2004). Drollet told Nic Maclellan on
abc’s Go Asia Pacific program that
when the new government conducted
a financial inventory it found that
France had not yet paid the us$250
million promised as compensation 
for nuclear testing, as well as other
amounts pledged for infrastructure
improvement. Drollet expected France
to live up to commitments it had
made to the previous regime: “We’re
obliged to be partners as we have
years of shared history and things
don’t change that much from one 
day to the next” (abc, 30 June 2004).
Temaru also met with Moruroa e
Tatou (French Nuclear Weapons Test
Veterans) and agreed to create a sub-
committee to look into the impact of
nuclear testing (PIR, 6 July 2004). As
the annual Heiva i Tahiti festival was
about to begin, he met with French
High Commissioner Michel Mathieu
and said he was “glad we’re on the
same wave length” (TP, 11 July 2004).
The June issue of the independent
monthly magazine Tahiti-Pacifique
carried several analyses of the Temaru
“revolution,” calling it a vote not for
independence but against the “Flosse
system.” Temaru’s slim ta majority
depended on cooperation with auton-
omists, though he did inherit Flosse’s
reinvented presidency. Editor Du Prel
highlighted several factors that helped
to explain Flosse’s setback. For exam-
ple, his own electoral reform back-
fired (by giving the bonus of seats to
the upd rather than to Tahoeraa in
the populous Windward Islands), as
did his decision to call an early elec-
tion instead of waiting until 2006. In
addition, the nuclear-testing era had
disrupted French Polynesia, which
had languished under benign neglect
before 1965 and thus maintained its
communal, rural traditions until the
influx of cep money and metropolitan
personnel with high salaries changed
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everything. The autonomy statute that
Flosse himself achieved in 1984 kept
the outside money flowing in and
created new class divisions, which for
the majority meant a “loss of dignity,
and that is not accepted by the Poly-
nesian” (TPM, June 2004, 10).
Thus Tavini came to represent the
have-nots, who had migrated to the
capital but had been excluded from
the Flosse patronage system and from
the high salaries that raised prices for
everyone. In 2001 alone, Flosse’s min-
isters received pay increases of 42 per-
cent, which, combined with the extra
pay that metropolitan civil servants
earned by working on contract in the
overseas territories, forced local fami-
lies to pool their resources to survive.
Ultimately, Flosse was trapped in his
own ivory tower, surrounded by yes-
men and cut off from reality. Even the
expatriate business community turned
against him because of high taxes.
Political scientist Sémir Al Wardi
noted that under the old voting sys-
tem Tahoeraa would have preserved
its absolute majority, that the very
lack of debate over the details of the
new statute had allowed a determined
opposition to misunderstand or mis-
represent some of its provisions, and
that the more Flosse created national-
ist symbols to defuse a desire for
independence, the more he made that
concept itself less dramatic. As the
mass marches in Papeete of 15 May
showed, Flosse had enabled the upd
to become the champion of democ-
racy, defending republican liberties
against tyranny and privilege, the
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Hawaiian Issues
On 7 September 2003, Native Hawai-
ians and supporters from all walks of
life flooded Waikïkï, Hawai‘i’s tour-
ism Mecca, with a sea of red shirts
symbolizing the red ‘äweoweo (a
school of small red fish seen as pre-
dicting a big change). Clad in t-shirts
that read “Kü i ka Pono!” (Stand for
Justice), an estimated 8,000 people
marched in support of native rights
and institutions and in protest against
efforts to dismantle them (Bernardo
2003). The primary sponsors, ‘Ïlio‘u-
laokalani (a coalition of kumu hula
[hula masters]) and the Kamehameha
Schools, were able to rally often-dis-
parate voices within the Hawaiian
community. Students, teachers, com-
munity leaders, representatives from
several ali‘i (chiefly, royal) trusts, state
offices, and civic clubs stood together
as one to face a common threat.
Other notables participating in the
march were Governor Linda Lingle
and Lieutenant Governor Duke Aiona,
who delivered a speech from atop a
makeshift podium. Even University 
of Hawai‘i President Evan Dobelle,
uh Mänoa Chancellor Peter Englert,
and other supportive university
administrators made the trek down
the tourist-lined streets.
The 2003 Kü i Ka Pono march 
was organized in response to the
numerous lawsuits challenging the
existence of the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs and the Department of
Hawaiian Home Lands, as well as 
the Hawaiian-preference admissions
policy of the Kamehameha Schools—
in particular, the Arakaki v Lingle,
Mohica-Cummings v Kamehameha
Schools, and Doe v Kamehameha
cases. Since the march, the Mohica-
Cummings case has been settled out
of court, allowing the student in ques-
tion to stay at the school provided he
remain in good standing. The Kame-
hameha Schools prevailed in the Doe
case. In Arakaki v Lingle, the courts
ruled that the Department of Hawai-
ian Home Lands, a US federal agency,
could not be included in the litigation;
the case is still pending.
‘Ïlio‘ulaokalani was planning
another Kü i Ka Pono march for
6 September 2004, the one-year
anniversary of the original march.
But this time, one man would be
noticeably absent from the ranks of
marchers. As a result of a controver-
sial decision by the University of
Hawai‘i Board of Regents, Evan
Dobelle was unceremoniously fired
from his position as the university’s
president.
Evan Dobelle came to Hawai‘i
with a substantial reputation for
enacting change and reinvigorating
stagnating institutions. Born in Wash-
ington, Dobelle earned his bachelor’s,
master’s, and PhD degrees from the
University of Massachusetts and an
additional master’s in public adminis-
tration from Harvard. He went on 
to occupy such positions as mayor of
Pittsfield, Massachusetts; chief of pro-
tocol for the White House; assistant
secretary of state during the Carter
administration; chief financial officer
of the Democratic National Commit-
tee; president of Middlesex Commu-
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nity College; chancellor and president
of the City College System of San
Francisco; and president of Trinity
College in Hartford, Connecticut.
While at Trinity College, Dobelle
was credited as the driving force
behind the revitalization of surround-
ing neighborhoods, previously over-
run with drug dealers and plagued by
crime. The new “Learning Corridor,”
which includes a Montessori elemen-
tary school, a middle school, a high
school, a job-training center, and a
police substation, rejuvenated the area
surrounding the college. On campus,
a performing arts center, a studio arts
building, and an expanding library
made the struggling college more
appealing. As a result, the number of
applications to the school increased
34 percent in the following years
(Wolfe 1998).
Meanwhile, the University of
Hawai‘i was beset with sliding
national rankings, significant budget
cutbacks, and a faculty strike in April
of 2001. Someone of Dobelle’s back-
ground was just what the university
was looking for to energize and revi-
talize the institution. His accomplish-
ments stood out among the seventy
other applicants to fill former Presi-
dent Kenneth Mortimer’s shoes. On
1 July 2001, President Dobelle took
the reins, with an annual salary of
$442,000 and a seven-year contract
(Gima 2004).
Immediately on taking office,
Dobelle began remodeling the univer-
sity by replacing the old community
college system with one in which the
various regional campuses were com-
ponents of one cohesive system. He
sought to model the University of
Hawai‘i after the successful University
of California system by streamlining
administration, unifying all ten cam-
puses, and turning the community
colleges into four-year baccalaureate
schools. In his first-year evaluation as
president, Dobelle was praised by the
uh Board of Regents and credited
with inspiring “a change in attitude”
throughout the system (Creamer and
Depledge 2004). However, faculty,
junior administrators, and the power-
ful board of regents soon grew dis-
satisfied with the systematic upheaval
of the ongoing reorganization.
Perhaps his greatest misstep, and
indeed the turning point in Dobelle’s
career in Hawai‘i, was his endorse-
ment of Democratic Lieutenant
Governor Mazie Hirono in the 2002
gubernatorial race. After Hirono was
defeated by Republican Linda Lingle,
the new governor shared with the
press her disappointment in Dobelle’s
endorsement.
In addition, the grand promises
Dobelle made on his installation 
had yet to show tangible results. In 
a scathing essay called “Dangerous
Equations,” Amy Agbayani, Director
of Student Equity, Excellence and
Diversity, along with Dr Ralph
Moberly, Senator Donna Mercado
Kim, and Representative Mark 
Takai, wrote that, after two years of
Dobelle’s administration, they saw
“an institution where student tuition
is being raised while administrative
salaries are boosted by more than $4
million, where substance and services
take a back seat to marketing and
public relations, and where a globe-
trotting President fails to bring home
the money he promised.” The authors
concluded that “our beloved Univer-
sity is in turmoil—from highly paid
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administrators who have not proven
their worth to concerns about crony-
ism, from constituencies who have
been ignored and million-dollar logo
and marketing plans to questionable
expenditures of research funds, from
inattention to administrative arro-
gance and deception” (Agbayani and
others 2003). Meanwhile, Governor
Lingle appointed four new members
to the university’s board of regents.
Ultimately, she would appoint eight of
the twelve-member board. Supporters
of Dobelle decried the mounting criti-
cism as arising from political retribu-
tion for his endorsement of a defeated
gubernatorial candidate, and as cheap
shots based in political patronage
(Rees 2004).
By April 2004, rumors of the
dysfunctional relationship between
Dobelle and the board of regents were
circulating rapidly and seemed to be
confirmed by an unfavorable second-
year evaluation of Dobelle by the
board. Dobelle was highly criticized
for having politicized the university
when he endorsed a gubernatorial
candidate the year before; hiring
former contacts as consultants and
top administrators; and spending 
too lavishly on travel (Gima 2004).
However, Dobelle was able to earn
a few allies at the university. One of
his first acts as president had been to
grant an unprecedented $1.5 million
for Native Hawaiian programs at the
university. In addition, acknowledging
that the university itself sits on land
formerly belonging to the Kingdom
of Hawai‘i, he committed to creating
a “Hawaiian place of learning.” By
this, he earned the loyalty of the
Kuali‘i Council (the Mänoa division
of Püko‘a, the Native Hawaiian
advisory council to the uh system),
as he was the first president to
acknowledge the needs of Native
Hawaiian students and the positive
impact of incorporating Hawaiian
ideals at the university level. When
the board of regents announced their
decision to fire Dobelle as president in
June of 2004, members of the council
were quick to deliver their objections
to the board.
The board’s decision to fire Dobelle
came as a surprise to most, including
Dobelle, who was away on the US
continent visiting colleges with his 
son at the time. While the tension
between Dobelle and the board was
well known, their decision to fire him
and announce it to the media before
informing Dobelle was perceived as
political retribution. Former Governor
Benjamin Cayetano characterized
their actions as “no class, that is
absolutely no class” (Creamer and
Depledge 2004). In addition, the
board said that Dobelle was being
terminated “for cause,” which was
defined in his contract as one of the
following: conviction for a felony
offense; mental instability or other
inability to perform the duties of the
office; or conduct that “(a) constitutes
moral turpitude, (b) brings public
disrespect and contempt or ridicule
upon the university, and (c) proven 
in a court of law, would constitute
grounds for criminal conviction of 
the president or civil liability of the
university” (Daysog 2004). In the
event of a “for cause” termination,
Dobelle would be ineligible for his
$2.2 million severance package.
In the weeks following the
announcement, the exact “cause” 
was not revealed, but members of 
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the board hinted at financial inaccura-
cies in Dobelle’s expense accounts.
Inevitably, Dobelle challenged the
firing and was able to win back most
of his original severance package,
after he was absolved of wrongdoing
and the board admitted that there
was no “cause” to fire Dobelle in the
first place. Dobelle has been given a
two-year research appointment with
the uh Urban and Regional Planning
Department.
In a related political issue,
Hawai‘i’s congressional delegation
put forth a new version of the bill 
for the federal recognition of Native
Hawaiians as indigenous peoples of
America. Previously referred to as the
“Akaka Bill” (after Hawai‘i’s Senator
Daniel Akaka who introduced the
original bill in 1999), the bill has been
officially renamed the “Native Hawai-
ian Government Reorganization Act.”
In the new version, the bill stipulates
a twenty-year statute of limitations on
claims against the United States after
passage of the bill and provides more
detailed procedures for the defining
and registration of “Native Hawai-
ians.” The bill continues to incite
controversy both within and outside
the Native Hawaiian community. On
the US side, however, it seems that
federal recognition is preferred, at
least compared to any other kind of
self-determination initiatives. In Jan-
uary 2004, the US Congress passed
legislation creating the Office of
Native Hawaiian Relations under 
the jurisdiction of the US Department
of Interior, parallel to the existing
Bureau of Indian Affairs. [For more
on the “Akaka Bill,” see the article by
J Këhaulani Kauanui, this issue, pages
1–27; and the interview with Mililani
Trask by Noe Noe Wong-Wilson, this
issue, pages 142–156.]
Another controversial issue is the
fragile relationship between the Bishop
Museum and the Native Hawaiian
community. This time, the controversy
centers on the handling of burial arti-
facts. For centuries, native peoples all
over the world have had bones and
other sacred objects exhumed and put
on display in museums and in other
private collections. In 1990, descen-
dants of these stolen ancestors—at
least those in the United States—
found relief in the passage of the
Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act (nagpra). The
act was designed to provide a process
for repatriating human remains, asso-
ciated funerary objects, objects of cul-
tural patrimony, and sacred objects to
Native American and Native Hawai-
ian descendants. As a result, bones
and other funerary items formerly
held by museums and in private col-
lections have been reclaimed by their
descendants.
But the situation in Hawai‘i is
considerably more complex. The
characteristics of a “Native Hawaiian
organization” are less stringent than
those of Native American groups,
leaving room for multiple interpreta-
tions. Hawai‘i’s own Bishop Museum
seeks to be recognized as such an
institution.
In the museum’s Interim and pro-
posed Final Guidance of nagpra
statement, they argue that “Bishop
Museum” was “conceived and made
real by the ali‘i (chiefs) and other
people of the Hawaiian Kingdom”
and that the museum has a “dual 
role as a steward of Native Hawaiian
culture as well as a museum with
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repatriation responsibilities.” The
museum recognizes itself as a “Native
Hawaiian Organization” (nho) for
three reasons. First, “no nho is cul-
turally affiliated with nagpra cul-
tural items from Hawai‘i [as a result
of] the breaking of the kapu system 
in 1819 and the rapid metamorphosis
of the traditional forms of Hawaiian
governance that were maintained
through the kapu system into West-
ernized forms of government and
religion.” Therefore, “it is difficult to
conclude that any existing nho can
be traced back to a specific ‘identifi-
able earlier group,’ other than all
Hawaiians existing before traditional
practices were discontinued in 1819.” 
However, if we view the idea of
“shared group identity” from a
broader perspective, then all groups,
including the museum, “meeting the
nho requirement of purpose, func-
tion and expertise in respect to
Native Hawaiians has a relationship
of shared group identity to the Native
Hawaiian people of old.” Anyone
engaged in the perpetuation of the
Native Hawaiian culture qualifies.
Third, the Bishop Museum became
the stewards of the objects formerly
held by the Hawaiian National
Museum established during the
Hawaiian Kingdom after the over-
throw of the Hawaiian monarchy.
Because the museum has continued its
role as repository and steward of the
objects to the present, it is a direct
descendant of the national repository.
This is portrayed as establishing the
Museum’s “close cultural affiliation 
to cultural items in the collections.”
(Bishop Museum 2004).
Besides funerary objects, nagpra
also sets up policies for the repatria-
tion of objects of “cultural patri-
mony” and “sacred objects.” “Cul-
tural patrimony” refers to objects 
that have an “ongoing historical,
traditional, or cultural importance”
and “cannot be alienated, appropri-
ated, or conveyed by any individual”
(nagpra, 2[3][d]). “Sacred objects”
are those “specific ceremonial objects”
which are needed by “their present
day adherents” (2 nagpra, [3][c]).
However, the museum does not rec-
ognize that it has in its possession 
any objects that meet either of these
definitions. In addition, the museum
declares that it has “right of posses-
sion” of unassociated funerary objects
by virtue of “voluntary consent of an
individual or group that had authority
of alienation.” In other words, the
items were not stolen, as was com-
mon with Native American objects.
Opponents object to the museum’s
claim for three general reasons. First,
it is a direct conflict of interest that
“the Bishop Museum would be able
to claim cultural items from its own
collection while at the same time hold
responsibility for repatriation of such
items under nagpra” (Ayau 2004).
The museum could obstruct the repa-
triation of objects to other Native
Hawaiian Organizations in favor of
their own claims. Second, opponents
also argue that the museum’s claim
runs contrary to the intent of the law
that seeks redress for harms commit-
ted when Native people’s remains and
other objects were taken and put on
display in museums. Third, it “under-
mines the ability of Native Hawaiians
to provide proper care” by obstruct-
ing claims and opening new wounds
instead of healing old ones, thereby
canceling out nagpra objectives
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(Ayau 2004). Twenty-three cultural
practitioners signed a letter asserting
these arguments and further charac-
terized the proposed policy as “insult-
ing, paternalistic and colonial” (Ayau
2004). Hawai‘i’s Senator Daniel
Inouye, contributing author of
nagpra, also opposes the Bishop
Museum’s claim: “It is not a Hawai-
ian organization, it’s a museum”
(Viotti 2004).
In November 2003, the ongoing
tug-of-war over land in Hawai‘i
reached two milestones: the return of
Kaho‘olawe to the State of Hawai‘i,
and a historic sail to the Northwest
Hawaiian Islands to promote aware-
ness of environmental concern. For
over a century, land in Hawai‘i has
been under the control of the federal
and state governments. Following 
the 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor,
Kaho‘olawe was seized by the US
Navy for use in target practice. Sixty-
two years later, in November 2003,
the US military returned the devas-
tated island to the State of Hawai‘i to
be held in trust for Native Hawaiians.
As auspicious as the long-awaited
event was, there are mixed feelings
about the transfer of management
from the federal to state governments.
The decade-long clean-up effort by
the US military has only cleared a
small portion of the island. In fact,
when the navy officially left the island
on 12 March 2004, only about 71
percent of the surface and 9 percent
of the subsurface cleanup was esti-
mated to have been completed (Boyd
2003). In the minds of many involved
in the transition, as well as cultural
practitioners poised to access the
island, is the question of whether or
not the navy will continue its clean-up
efforts now that control of the island
has left their hands (Boyd 2003).
During the period of transition, access
remains guarded, as both the land
and surrounding reefs continue to 
be dangerous.
Many people think of the Hawai-
ian Islands as extending only as far as
the northernmost inhabited island of
Ni‘ihau. However, the archipelago
includes ten additional islands stretch-
ing 1,200 miles, with reefs covering
approximately 9,000 square kilo-
meters. The Northwestern Hawaiian
Islands are a haven for the most pris-
tine reef ecosystem in the world, with
nearly 7,000 species, one-quarter of
which are endemic to the area. The
reserve protecting the area was
established in December 2000 by
federal executive order. In May 2004,
a crew on the legendary double-
hulled voyaging canoe Höküle‘a
visited these islands, piloting the
multiagency effort, “Navigating
Change,” designed to raise awareness
of the environmental decline of the
main Hawaiian Islands and encour-
age people to care for and protect
remaining natural resources. (For
more information, please consult the
web sites of the Polynesian Voyaging
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2003–2004 has been a year of mas-
sive upheaval for Mäori. In June 
2003 the New Zealand government
announced its intention to legislate
the confiscation of the country’s fore-
shore and seabed from Mäori. At the
time there was a furious and unchar-
acteristically united outcry from
Mäori. The level of anger among
Mäori against the government on this
issue has increased over the past year
as the government has refused not
only to back down but also to enter
into any meaningful consultation or
dialogue with those who will be
directly affected, the numerous
coastal whänau (extended families)
and hapü (groupings of extended
families), many of whom have had
rights to their own particular areas 
of the coast for many hundreds of
years.
Mäori have organized their opposi-
tion with unprecedented levels of
cooperation, while the government
has tried desperately to undermine
them. Both the policy and the legis-
lation have come under sustained
attack as Mäori have used every
forum, strategy, and mechanism 
they could identify to try to have it
removed. This included mounting the
biggest protest march ever seen in the
country. They also attacked the male
Mäori members of the Labour gov-
ernment caucus, including the minis-
ter of Mäori affairs, labeling them as
traitors when they ended up support-
ing the legislation and ignoring the
clear and unequivocal instructions of
their constituents. Two Mäori women
members of government who opposed
the legislation drew huge support
from Mäori. When one of them, Tari-
ana Turia, resigned from Parliament,
forcing a by-election, voter turnout
was unusually high, even though none
of the main political parties offered
any candidates. After setting up and
then co-leading the new Mäori Party,
Turia took 92 percent of the vote,
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returning triumphantly to Parliament
with a new mandate.
But the government has remained
resolute and determined to pass its
foreshore and seabed legislation 
well before the 2005 general election,
launching attacks on Mäori leaders
and several judges in an attempt to
deflect their criticisms. Opposition
parties, except for New Zealand First,
opposed the legislation but made it
very clear that they were not doing so
to support Mäori legal entitlements.
Only the Green Party supported
Mäori. And in the midst of the fore-
shore and seabed turmoil, highlights
on the Mäori calendar—such as the
successful launching of the long-
awaited Mäori Television Service 
in March 2004, the nomination of
Keisha Castle-Hughes to win an
Academy Award for her role in
Whale Rider, and the launch of the
Mäori Party—were all seized on by
Mäori to assist them in their battle to
stop the government’s foreshore and
seabed legislation.
The government decision to pursue
legislation to remove Mäori rights to
the foreshore and seabed was a knee-
jerk reaction to the Court of Appeal’s
unanimous decision in the Marlbor-
ough case (that is, the case of Ngati
Apa, Ngati Koata, Ngati Kuia, Ngati
Rarua, Ngati Tama, Ngati Toa and
Rangitane and Anor v the Attorney-
General and Ors ca ca 173/01). 
The decision, issued on 19 June 2003,
indicated that the Crown’s assertion
of its ownership of the country’s fore-
shore and seabed was not correct, 
and that the Mäori Land Court had
the jurisdiction to investigate the
status of that land and to determine
whether it is customary Mäori land.
The decision upheld domestic law
(The Mäori Land Act); English com-
mon law (which recognizes that when
the English colonize another country,
indigenous peoples’ “customary rights
and title” to their lands remain and
cannot be extinguished in times of
peace without their consent); and
international law (with respect to 
the rights of indigenous peoples). 
The decision brought huge, albeit 
very temporary, relief for coastal
whänau, hapü, and iwi (tribal group-
ings) throughout the country. After
134 years of pursuing ownership of
the foreshore and seabed through the
courts, blockages were now removed
and the court could investigate Mäori
property rights claims, including
ownership.
Four days later, in a move that
showed flagrant disregard for all
constitutional conventions and due
process, the government announced
that it would legislate to stop all New
Zealand Courts from considering
cases that were already before them
on the matter. The legislation would
overrule the decision of the Court 
of Appeal and vest complete and
absolute ownership of the seabed 
and foreshore in the Crown, confis-
cating it from the whänau and hapü
throughout the country who hold
mana whenua and hence ownership
of them. (Very simplistically, mana
whenua can be defined as the power,
authority, control, and responsibility
derived from the gods for a particular
area of land.) However, the govern-
ment would protect any non-Mäori
interests in the foreshore and seabed.
So the harbor boards, port compa-
nies, and an increasing number of
private individuals, many of whom
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are foreign investors and speculators,
would not have their property rights
removed. Such a blatantly racist
approach meant that the government
was effectively singling out Mäori
and declaring war on them. The
Mäori response was immediate and
unanimous: complete opposition and
abhorrence of what the government
was suggesting. But for Mäori it was
also simply history repeating itself. 
In the 1860s the government had
legislated to confiscate Mäori land 
in order to satisfy settler greed for
Mäori land and resources. Predictably,
that led to the New Zealand land
wars. This was no different. The ease
with which the government could
flout fundamental constitutional
norms, and domestic, common, or
international law, took legal scholars
by surprise and brought into question
the sanctity of the rule of law (Tomas
and Johnston 2003; Brookfield 2004;
Ruru 2004; Waitangi Tribunal 2004;
Bennion 2004a, 2004b).
The powerlessness and marginal-
ization of Mäori within the New
Zealand Parliament was clearly on
display as their increasingly angry
protests went unheeded. By August
the government had published their
proposal (Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet 2003). In
December its policy was released. In
April 2004 the Foreshore and Seabed
Bill was introduced in the House. In
July, a parliamentary select committee
started hearing submissions on the
bill; it is scheduled to report back by
November 2004. Although all ten
government members of Parliament
who have declared their Mäori back-
ground strenuously opposed the pro-
posed confiscation when it was first
announced (NZH, 25 June 2003),
Mäori were stunned and mystified
when all but two of them were subse-
quently persuaded to support it. Their
support, along with the belated sup-
port of the New Zealand First Party,
would ensure its safe passage through
Parliament. It was as a direct result of
these betrayals that the Mäori Party
was set up, with a mandate that the
clearly articulated wishes of the peo-
ple must take precedence over the
wishes of the party.
It did not take long for the sinister,
anti-Mäori underbelly of the Päkehä
population to display itself, as reports
of a poll indicated that most were
happy to support the legislation (NZH,
18 Aug 2003). They were happy, it
seemed, for the Crown to take owner-
ship of the foreshore and seabed
regardless of the strong Mäori inter-
ests already there, or the fact that, in
the Court of Appeal, the Crown had
been unable to prove ownership. This
theft by legislation was an easy way
of getting a very substantial resource
for free. After all, the high standard
of living enjoyed by the great majority
of Päkehä New Zealanders has always
depended on their being able to gain
access to Mäori land and resources 
at little or no cost, regardless of how
unfair and unjust that might be for
the Mäori owners, or the fact that
most of those acquisitions were ille-
gal. Just when Mäori were hoping
that the treaty claims processes were
finally signaling an end to such dis-
crimination, it resurfaced with even
greater vigor and determination.
The opposition recognized the
growing Päkehä backlash against
Mäori and was quick to exploit it. In
January 2004, leader of the National
212 the contemporary pacific • 17:1 (2005)
Party and the opposition Don Brash,
to his considerable political advan-
tage, promised to abolish “special
privileges” for Mäori. He portrayed
the Waitangi Tribunal as delivering
privileges to Mäori, deliberately mis-
representing its role of identifying
breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi
and recommending strategies for
removing the prejudice caused. When
Mäori and the media asked him to
identify the “special privileges,” he
could not do so, but it didn’t appear
to matter. His ratings in the opinion
polls continued to climb, ignoring the
fact that, as both history and statistics
show, it is Päkehä who enjoy substan-
tial privileges in New Zealand, and
Mäori and their Pacific Island rela-
tions who are overwhelmingly the
country’s most disadvantaged groups.
Georgina Te Heuheu, who had been
Brash’s spokesperson on Mäori Affairs
and the only Mäori in the National
Party caucus, was sacked after she
declined to support her leader’s
attacks; she was replaced by the
deputy leader, who was happy to
launch even harsher attacks on Mäori.
The attacks were unashamedly and
openly racist, and the long-held pre-
tense that most Päkehä New Zealand-
ers do not harbor racist attitudes
toward Mäori could no longer be
sustained. But that did not stop them
from attacking one of the country’s
foremost and internationally
acclaimed entertainers, Bic Runga,
when she told an Irish newspaper in
March that New Zealand can be a
racist country and that racism had
been a constant feature of her child-
hood in Christchurch (BT, 26 March
2004).
The National Party’s success in
attacking Mäori was quickly picked
up by the government, with the 
prime minister announcing her own
“review” of Mäori programs. In fact
the government had already started
withdrawing funding from Mäori
programs, so the opposition attack
allowed the withdrawal to proceed
more expeditiously. Most Mäori pro-
grams would have difficulty surviving
without government assistance. But
the unpublicized withdrawal of $6
million from the Mäori Television
Service just six weeks before it was
launched did not prevent it from
going on the air in March and enjoy-
ing good reviews from all commenta-
tors. One of its very few detractors
was the National Party, which prom-
ised to close it down. But a poll taken
in June indicated good support for 
the service, with non-Mäori making
up 65 percent of its audience (NZH,
25 June 2004). The service is
unashamedly supportive of Mäori 
and often very critical of the govern-
ment. It is unlikely that government
funding will be restored, but given 
the quality and professionalism of the
service it is expected that the private
funding provided to launch and keep
the service running will continue to be
available.
Mäori leaders were relying in part
on the media in their battle against
the government’s foreshore and sea-
bed legislation, and the Mäori Televi-
sion Service was a welcome addition
to their resources. Since July 2003
they had been organizing hui (gather-
ings) and running information cam-
paigns to keep Mäori and the general
public fully informed on the issue.
Within three weeks of the govern-
ment’s first announcement they had
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convened a national hui to discuss 
the issue. The resolutions from the
1,000-strong gathering of iwi from
throughout the country signaled very
strong warnings to both the govern-
ment and all Mäori members of Par-
liament not to attempt to extinguish
or redefine Mäori customary title or
rights. Representatives returned home
from the meeting to inform their com-
munities of the outcomes and to seek
instructions on measures to be taken
to resolve the problem. Hui were con-
vened by iwi groups throughout the
country and a second national gather-
ing was held at the end of August.
The August 2003 hui established 
a collective called Te Ope Mana a 
Tai, a name that translates approxi-
mately as “the group that holds para-
mount authority for the coast and
seas.” It was made up of tribal lead-
ers, legal advisors (including judges),
policy analysts, media experts, and
other professionals. It was headed 
by the iwi that had won the Court 
of Appeal decision and included rep-
resentation from most other coastal
iwi. Its mandate was to gather and
disseminate information to Mäori 
and the general public and to carry
out work on behalf of Mäori on this
issue. The group undertook an exten-
sive publicity campaign in an attempt
to inform the country of the serious-
ness of the issue—and to counter the
misinformation, being promulgated
by the government, that if Mäori
ownership was given legal recogni-
tion, Mäori would close off access 
to the country’s beaches and sell
them. Te Ope Mana a Tai also relied
heavily on decisions from the many
local and regional hui convened to
discuss the matter, and from the three
further national hui that they con-
vened. Other important means of
strategizing, keeping people informed,
and seeking the support of non-Mäori
included a website <www.teope.co
.nz>; e-mail groups; teleconferencing;
public and conference presentations;
university seminars and lectures;
advertising through pamphlets, post-
ers, and education packages; meeting
with government ministers and other
members of Parliament; supporting
the national Hikoi (protest march);
Mäori radio; and mainstream news
media. Several iwi also presented for-
mal complaints before a number of
United Nations committees respon-
sible for human and indigenous
peoples’ rights.
In October, Te Ope Mana a Tai 
led a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal
against the government’s foreshore
and seabed policy. One hundred
forty-nine claimants representing
almost every coastal tribal group
around the country pooled their
resources and expertise to bring the
claim under urgency. In March the
tribunal reported, upholding the
claims and issuing very serious warn-
ings to the government about the
foolhardiness of proceeding in the
manner announced in the policy. One
commentator noted that the report 
“is damning of the Crown framework
policy, using some of the strongest
language seen in a tribunal report 
to date” (Bennion 2004a, 1). The
tribunal noted that the government’s
policy contains numerous breaches 
of the Treaty of Waitangi, stating that
“the Government’s unilateral decision
to do away with these Mäori property
rights . . . could only be justified if
chaos or disorder would result if
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there was no intervention, or if we
were at war or facing some other
crisis” (Waitangi Tribunal 2004, 108).
It also strongly urged the government
to act in fairness and recommended
that the government go back to the
drawing board and engage Mäori in
proper negotiations. According to the
tribunal, there is no need for the gov-
ernment to implement any policy, and
the law should be allowed to take its
course.
Yet on the day the tribunal
released its foreshore and seabed
report, the government announced
that it had already rejected the report
(NZH, 8 March 2004). Matters cov-
ered in the accompanying press release
bore little resemblance to the content
of the report and there was specula-
tion that government leaders had not
even bothered to read it. The present
government has rejected all recent
findings of the tribunal.
Many iwi had also applied to 
the Mäori Land Court to have cases
involving their own foreshore and
seabed heard as soon as the Court of
Appeal decision was issued. However,
when the court began to process the
case in one district in March 2004,
the prime minister ignored constitu-
tional convention and launched a
stinging public attack on the judge
hearing the case, demanding that she
not hear it because she was from the
same tribe as the applicants (NZH,
13 March 2004). While it would be
unheard of for a politician to launch
a personal attack on a non-Mäori
judge, it seemed to be acceptable to
attack a Mäori judge. The judge for-
mally reprimanded the prime minister
in her decision.
It was the government’s ongoing
refusal to listen to any Mäori advice
or to consider the Waitangi Tribunal’s
recommendations that led to the big-
gest and most successfully organized
protest march ever witnessed in New
Zealand. It was called the Hikoi.
Whänau, hapü, and iwi from through-
out the country, with their colorful
tribal banners and flags, joined it on
its way from Te Rerenga Wairua in
the very far north, starting on 22
April, and ending in Parliament
grounds in Wellington on 5 May. 
The number of people who were
mobilized throughout the country was
unprecedented. The Hikoi itself was
highly disciplined, yet good-natured,
and a dignified stance was maintained
throughout. Police reported experi-
encing no trouble and there were no
arrests (NZH, 6 May 2004). While
many New Zealanders had become
confused on the issue, the clear mes-
sage of the Hikoi was that the fore-
shore and seabed legislation was terri-
bly wrong and had to be withdrawn
from Parliament. Mäori simply would
not tolerate yet another treaty breach
that was so clearly illegal, immoral,
and unjust.
On the final day of the Hikoi
through Wellington, the police esti-
mated there were 50,000 participants,
including the several thousand kau-
mätua (Mäori elders) who awaited its
arrival at Parliament. The government
tried desperately to play down both
its size and impact, claiming that
there were only 15,000 participants,
and that it was a reaction to an
attack on Mäori by the leader of the
opposition. However, while media
reports varied hugely on size esti-
mates (ranging between 10,000 and
30,000), they were very clear on the
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message (NZH, 6 May 2004). All
media reports described the march 
as a protest against the government’s
foreshore and seabed legislation. The
media coverage was extensive, both
locally and nationally. It also attracted
significant international media
attention.
The prime minister’s constant
criticisms of the Hikoi over the two
weeks of its duration simply fueled
the determination of the participants
to deliver a clear and unequivocal
message. As the numbers swelled, she
referred to the participants as “haters
and wreckers,” telling the media she
preferred the company of a sheep to
that of iwi representatives leading the
march. Yet even she was unable to
ignore the Hikoi. Television cameras
caught her watching from the win-
dow of her office as the marchers
completely filled Parliament grounds
(Te Kaea, 5 May 2004). Many parti-
cipants could not get into the grounds
and remained outside on the sur-
rounding roads and pathways to lis-
ten to the speeches of Mäori leaders,
including Tariana Turia, which were
broadcast from inside the grounds.
margaret mutu
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Wallis and Futuna
In a speech on 1 July 2003, Wallis and
Futuna High Commissioner Christian
Job officially announced that the insti-
tution of direct income taxation was
being considered. This reform, which
had been proposed by French Over-
seas Minister Brigitte Girardin during
her visit to the territory in December
2002, would be undertaken slowly
and deliberately. For indeed, Wallis
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and Futuna’s main problem lies in the
deplorable state of its finances. On the
one hand, tax revenue is essentially
related to the taxation of imported
products, because exports are nearly
nonexistent. On the other hand, the
territory has lived beyond its means
for a long time, as generous but bud-
get-consuming measures have gradu-
ally led to a chronic deficit in the local
budget. Staff expenses have increased
by a factor of 2.5 in ten years. Wel-
fare has increased fivefold. Connected
to this, although the airfare between
Wallis and Futuna has an actual cost
of 20,000 fcfp, passengers only pay
9,000 fcfp, thanks to a deficiency
grant for the air service. To date, in
addition to its direct spending, the
French State contributes to balancing
the local budget to the tune of 376
million fcfp. 
All of this explains the implemen-
tation of a recovery plan that includes
overhauling welfare schemes, revising
the prices of domestic services,
improving the tracking of expenses,
retaining rather than systematically
replacing government agents, and
even considering changes to the tax
system. With this aim, an additional
clause to the development contract
was signed on 23 July 2003 for 1.5
billion fcfp. The 2004 budget was
carefully set up so as not to over-
estimate revenue or omit the slightest
expense, including debts from previ-
ous years.
Wallisians and Futunians greatly
regretted that when Jacques Chirac,
president of the French Republic,
visited New Caledonia on 23 July
2003, he did not stop in Wallis before
flying on to French Polynesia. It was
finally on 1 December 2003 that the
special agreement between France,
New Caledonia, and Wallis and
Futuna was signed in Paris. The
agreement endorses the autonomy 
of French State services in Wallis 
and Futuna, and clarifies the support
of France and New Caledonia for the
economic development of the archi-
pelago. A tripartite committee is to
monitor this agreement. 
In spite of signing the special
agreement, it would seem that the
archipelago of Wallis and Futuna
actually remains closely linked to
New Caledonia, both economically
and demographically. The main prob-
lem between Wallis and Futuna and
New Caledonia is the overseas terri-
tory debt owed by Wallis and Futuna
to Caledonian administrations for air-
line, hospitals, and education facilities.
This debt comes to nearly 3 billion
fcfp, and France is considering a
deficiency grant to discharge it. 
When the agreement was signed,
Senator Robert Laufoaulu pointed 
out that the health agency’s sizeable
debt was the responsibility of the
French State.
Epifano Tui, a councillor in the
opposition, resigned from his term of
office on 18 July 2003. Tui “wanted
to attract the attention of the elected
officials, who according to him, only
have deliberative powers, but no
responsibility as far as the executive 
is concerned” (FM 45). Because of 
the law on male /female parity, the
second candidate on the slate, Salome
Moeliku-Seo, was allowed to become
the second woman in the current
assembly.
Marie-Claude Tjibaou, an eco-
nomic and social advisor in New
Caledonia, traveled to Wallis as head
of a delegation on 8 September 2003
in order to carry out a study on social
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housing. On 15 September, Secretary
of State for Transport Dominique
Bussereau went to Wallis before visit-
ing Futuna the next day. He agreed to
help the territory find a new airplane
for its domestic services. He also vis-
ited the site of the future fishing port
of Halalo, the development of which
will cost one billion fcfp.
Administratively, it seemed 
that High Commissioner Job was
appointed to remind the public ser-
vice of its duties. After the major
postal services strike of February–
April 2003, which ended inconclu-
sively for the strikers, a strike by the
staff of the Reseau France Outremer
(rfo) in May–June 2004 also ended
in a return to the status quo. Local
rfo employees were calling for the
dismissal of the agency’s Melanesian
director; additional jobs; and an
increase in their salaries to match 
the expatriate workers’ 2.05 percent
“index” (the increase in wages for
public servants working outside
metropolitan France). However, they
were already the highest paid workers
in the territory, with a staff of seventy
to run a service that could well oper-
ate with fewer people. 
In July 2003, France carried out a
general census of the territory’s popu-
lation, an operation that allowed the
state to reevaluate its financial contri-
butions. Wallis has a population of
10,094, and Futuna 4,873, represent-
ing a total increase of 5.7 percent over
the 1996 population of 14,166. In
Futuna the increase was 5.1 percent
and in Wallis 5.9 percent. Alofi is no
longer considered uninhabited, as two
permanent inhabitants have been
registered there. 
The public works department has
ordered three drilling operations into
the water table from a Caledonian
company (Forapac), with financing
from the French State and the Fonds
d’investissement pour le développe-
ment économique et social de l’outre-
mer (fides), in order to secure the
island’s water supply for the next
fifteen years. In parallel fashion, the
water and electricity company (eewf)
had drilling carried out on its Mata-
Utu concession, in order to be able 
to cool its machines using less costly
“untreated” water. As for infrastruc-
ture, a large part of west coast roads
is being tarred: a twelve-kilometer
section will provide access to homes
and food-producing gardens. This
state-financed work is being carried
out in an ecological way, as the runoff
is directed toward deep ditches from
which it can infiltrate the water table,
thus avoiding any dumping of muddy
water into the lagoon.
On the judicial scene, in August
2003 the criminal court of Mata-Utu
convicted Soane Uhila, the former
president of the Territorial Assembly,
for the misuse of public office and the
misuse of company assets in the affair
of the express ferry. This conviction
was upheld by the Noumea Court of
Appeal in May 2004. Uhila is now
ineligible for public office for five
years. In another case, a twenty-six-
year-old employee of Général Import
entered the shop during the night 
and stole 3 million fcfp from the 
till. This young man, who had been 
in debt, was arrested the very next
morning. In the local context, where
90 percent of households owe money,
he was sentenced to only four months’
imprisonment and allowed to serve
his sentence in Wallis. This theft,
much bigger than the usual burglaries,
raised the issue of credit in a territory
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where the whole population practices
“le marquage,” that is, the deferred
payment of purchases, and where
great indebtedness is common. 
A dispute between the swafepp
company and the customary owners
of the land on which Futuna’s fuel
depot sits led to the beginning of a
fuel shortage on the island. In fact,
after the company refused to hire a
member of the family in question, 
in August this family prevented the
docking of the oil tanker that usually
supplies the island from Fiji every
three weeks. In addition, damage was
done to the site, including dismantling
the fence and even some tank valves.
Finally, on 26 August an army plane
arrived from Noumea via Wallis with
twelve members of the security police.
The tanks were filled and the parties
met to reach an understanding.
By and large, Wallis and Futuna
society continues to live on the fringes
of modern life and there is a clear-cut
difference between national regula-
tions and local practices. Because it
comes under the auspices of the
French State, all gambling—including
bingo—is prohibited; yet, for fami-
lies, villages, and clubs throughout 
the archipelago, bingo is one of the
main forms of entertainment. Another
contrast is found in the fact that the
number of driver’s license holders
remains low, while the number of
accidents on the road is double the
national average. 
Emigration to France continues, 
by way of sports and the army. On
1 August 2003, John Babin, stationed
in Alsace, became the first Wallisian
captain of the French army. At the
same time, the “40 cadres” program
(modeled on New Caledonia’s “400
cadres” program for mid-career exec-
utive training) had just gotten under-
way, its first four beneficiaries having
flown to Lyon or Noumea in August
2003. Senator Laufoaulu, a strong
supporter of the project, reminded
them as they were leaving that they
were going to become the professional
elite of the territory and that, like
their elders, they would have to put
the general interest before their own.
In the medical sector, the infectious
disease brucellosis reappeared on pig
farms at the beginning of 2004.
Measures were taken to isolate and
slaughter the infected animals, thus
eradicating the epidemic. As the archi-
pelago no longer has a veterinary
doctor, the rural economy depart-
ment regularly brings veterinarians
over from New Caledonia. Their work
deals essentially with pig breeding. It
emerged that the cost of a family-run
farm was higher than the revenue it
produced. The 150-hectare pine for-
est of Malae was affected by a fungus;
as a result the villagers chopped down
and burnt the diseased trees. 
Regarding cultural activities, on
26 July 2003, Leonella Tuulaki was
selected Miss 2003, out of eleven
candidates. Dance groups traveled to
New Caledonia in May 2004 on the
invitation of the International Coun-
cil for Organising Folklore and Tradi-
tional Arts Festivals, presided over, on
behalf of the Pacific, by Isai Pagatele,
a Caledonian of Wallisian descent. 
On the sporting scene, the delega-
tion to the July 2003 South Pacific
Games in Fiji brought home nine
medals, including four silver medals:
javelin, shot put, karate, and tae
kwon do. The drop in the number of
medals compared to the Guam games
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can be explained by the new regula-
tions that require athletes to live in
the territory they represent, thereby
excluding Wallis and Futuna members
from New Caledonia. Criticized for
these results, the president of the
Sports and Territorial Olympic
Committee declared: “There isn’t a
competition for gossiping yet; but if
that day came, you would win the
gold medal” (FM 46).
In New Caledonia, the Saint-Louis
affair started up again on 25 August
2003 when a judge, by judicial letter,
instructed 270 gendarmes to besiege
the Saint-Louis tribe at dawn in order
to question those guilty of the 25 June
extortion (see Angleviel 2004). Four
Melanesians were arrested and eight
weapons seized. Kanak customary
leaders announced that because many
youths considered this operation to be
provocation, they would be uncon-
trollable. On 26 August, three road-
blocks made from tires and wood
were erected by the two sides facing
each other: the Kanaks from the
Saint-Louis tribe and the Wallisians-
Futunians of Ave Maria. Five 
armored police vehicles were needed
to clear these roadblocks.
This affair ended on 18 September
2003 with the departure from Ave
Maria of the last thirty Caledonian
families of Wallisian or Futunian
descent. The houses were stripped
bare and the roofs removed. Some of
the departing residents set fire to their
homes rather than abandon them to
the Melanesians who until that time
had been living on the other bank of
the river. The Southern Province, led
by the Rassemblement pour La Calé-
donie dans le République (rpcr), had
ensured that everyone involved was
rehoused. On 16 September, Didier
Leroux, president of the Alliance
party, spoke of “ethnic cleansing.”
On 19 September, High Commis-
sioner Job answered, “If those words
have meaning, we have opposed what
some call ethnic cleansing. Ethnic
cleansing means one population
killing another, and this is precisely
what we have avoided, for months
and months.” In his address, New
Caledonia High Commissioner Daniel
Constantin pointed out that the Saint-
Louis affair had caused three deaths,
six serious injuries, and thirteen minor
injuries; had involved 200 victims of
extortion of various kinds; 19 cars
and 18 houses had been shot at; one
armored police vehicle had been set
on fire; and 1,600 gunshots had been
fired during the month. 
It is to be noted that Laurent Vili
was transferred at the beginning of
August from the Noumea prison,
Camp Est, to the Fresnes prison (Paris
region), from which he was released
in early September for medical rea-
sons. Put on probation in Montpel-
lier, he resumed his position on the
rugby team. After one year of deten-
tion pending trial, he remains indicted
for the murder of Jean Marie
Goyetta.
The Rassemblement Démocratique
Océanien (rdo) organized a big pre-
electoral party for its tenth birthday
on 14 February 2004. In April 2003,
Tino Manuohalalo, former rdo vice
president, had created the Mouve-
ment des Citoyens Calédoniens (mcc).
His first conference, on 26 February
2004, gathered 550 natives of Wallis
and Futuna. This new community
party wants to become partners 
with the rpcr in the context of the
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Noumea Agreement and represent a
“bridge” between the rpcr and the
Front de Libération Nationale Kanak
Socialiste (flnks).
The Wallisian and Futunian com-
munity of New Caledonia played an
important part in the local elections
of May 2004. On the one hand, it
was represented in the Southern
Province by three community slates,
which obtained 1,140 votes (mcc),
749 (Union Océanienne), and 429
(Rassemblement Océanien dans la
Calédonie). Because the required 5
percent of registered voters would 
be 3,600 votes, none of these slates
had members elected. Nevertheless, 
as other Wallisians and Futunians
were present on anti-separatist slates,
Anne-Marie Siakinuu (Avenir Ensem-
ble) and Ana Logologofolau
(rpcr–ump) were elected. Thanks 
to the appointment of some elected
officials to the local government,
Corinne Fuluhea (rpcr) recovered
her position as provincial adviser. 
On the other hand, this community
only comprises one community party
in favor of independence: the rdo. 
A flnks member, this party had
presented a common slate with the
Palika (uni). It gathered about 5 per-
cent of Wallisian and Futunian votes,
showing that a large majority of
Polynesians wants New Caledonia to
remain part of France. Angéla Mana-
kofaiva (rdo) was elected in the
North province, on the uni–flnks
list. It must be pointed out that on
7 March 2004 the rdo president,
Aloisio Sako, became president of the
Wallisian community from the Hihifo
district.
In the sports sector, Bertrand Vili, 
a Caledonian of Wallisian descent,
beat New Caledonia’s record in the
discus at the New Zealand champi-
onships. He won the gold medal for
the discus and the shot put in the
Espoir category at the championships
of France in July 2003. In June 2004
Amete Luaki became the French
champion of weightlifting in the 
105 kg category. 
After only a year of existence, 
the weekly Fenua Magazine ceased
publication on 20 September 2003,
after the advertising market proved
inadequate; there is no longer any
written press whatsoever in Wallis
and Futuna. The disappearance of 
the weekly Fenua Magazine increases
the territory’s media isolation. 
frédéric angleviel 
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